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Abstract
In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa (2015) expli-
cates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing
so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and
applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in
particular, to the cognitive performance of judging. Sosa’s examples
in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will
argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive
examples he relies on. Ultimately, I think the source of the disanalogy
is a problematic picture of the cognitive performance of guessing and
its connection to knowledge and defeat. Once this critical line of ar-
gument is advanced, an alternative picture of guessing, qua cognitive
performance, is articulated, one which avoids the problems discussed,
and yet remains compatible with Sosa’s broader framework.
1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is a particular kind of cognitive performance—
guessing. As Sosa (2015) sees it, guessing is like judging, but not quite.
Both guessing and judging have an alethic aim. When we guess, as well as
when we judge, we aim to get it right. But judgment, on Sosa’s view, does
not aim merely to get it right. Judgment has a further epistemic aim, which
is to get it right aptly. And getting it right aptly involves competent risk
assessment.
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Competent risk assessment—and not just hitting the relevant target any old
way—is obviously important when engaged in sports, such as basketball. Sup-
pose you shoot from far beyond your threshold of reliable competence—by
chucking the ball toward the basket from the half court line. This (assum-
ing the shot clock is not expiring) is very poor shot selection in the context
of a basketball game. Your coach and teammates will rightly berate you
for taking such a foolish shot, even if it happens to go in. Things are very
similar in the cognitive arena: even if a wild guess turns out to be right by
happenstance—and even though (like the shot taken from half court) you
aimed by guessing to get it right, something is lacking. A correct but wild
guess (like the shot from half court that lands in the basket) is not apt, which
is to say, its accuracy does not manifest the shooter’s competence to make
the shot reliably enough1.
Of course, half-court shots in basketball games are very rarely ever taken.
Likewise, in inquiring, we very rarely—unless practically forced2—aim to get
it right by means of a wild guess3. However, compare shooting from half-court
(beyond one’s threshold for reliability) with shooting just barely within one’s
threshold for reliability, though in a circumstance where you can’t tell that
you are in fact within this threshold. This case is clearly different from the
case where you shot from half-court. Your shot in this case is apt, accurate
because adroit. Yet, there is still a kind of credit-reducing luck which taints
the assessment of the performance. Put simply, for all you knew, when you
1The matter of how reliable is ‘reliable enough’ is not invariant across domains of
endeavour but is sensitive to a range of factors specific to particular domains. As Sosa
(2015) puts it, ‘In basketball we know at least roughly where it lies, with due allowance for
the position of the player and his teammates, the time remaining on the clock, whether
the shot to be taken is a three-point shot, etc. Many factors thus bear in diverse ways,
and good players will take them into account, aiming not just to sink a basket, but to
manifest in so doing the full competence required’ (2015, 71). See also Sosa (2015, Ch. 8),
especially pp. 168-180 for a more detailed discussion of what it takes to be reliable enough,
situated within the context of pragmatic encroachment.
2This would be the cognitive analogue to being practically forced to shoot, as when
the shot clock is expiring. An example of such a cognitive situation might face a traveler,
starving and thirsty, who must choose which way to go at a fork in the road, only one
road she is told, leads to food and water. Here, practical circumstances force the traveler
to aim to get it right by taking a wild guess. But, were the traveler not under such duress,
the traveler would aim to get it right, but not by taking a wild guess–rather, by a more
reliable means.
3Wild guessing, under no kind of duress, is poor epistemic shot selection.
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shot, you were outside your threshold of reliability. You just happened to be
within this threshold. More carefully: your performance was first-order safe,
but not second-order safe4. You are just reliable enough from that distance
that not too easily would you fail to make your shot from there. But because
you are unaware of where this threshold lies, you too easily could have shot
inaptly, from just beyond your threshold of sufficient reliability.
Just as a basketball shot, under these circumstances, is not fully apt, neither
is what Sosa takes to be the cognitive analogue to such a basketball shot:
a guess under conditions under which you are just above the threshold for
sufficient reliability, but aren’t aware of this. Such a guess (unlike a wild guess)
would be first-order safe. But it would not be second-order safe because,
unaware of where the threshold lies, you too easily could have guessed inaptly.
Such a guess would be apt, but not fully apt; it would aspire to animal, but
not reflective, knowledge5.
The foregoing captures only in very broad brush strokes Sosa’s thinking about
guessing, and how guessing relates to other notions within his virtue episte-
mology. He has many more illuminating things to say. In fact, his remarks
on the topic of guessing (and its analogues, in the case of practical perfor-
mances) crop up at various places throughout Judgment and Agency. In
particular, what Sosa says about guessing plays an important and focused
role in his explication in Chapter 3 of the concept—central to Judgment and
Agency—of a fully apt performance. This distinguishes guessing as important
to Sosa’s wider project in the book, given that he applies the concept of a
fully apt performance in his account of the nature and normativity of human
judgment—the latter being his primary aim.
In this paper, I offer a focused critique of Sosa’s discussion of guessing, with
particular attention paid to the role which guessing plays in Sosa’s dialectical
project in Chapter 3, and to a lesser extent Chapters 6 and 8 of Judgment
and Agency. In response to the objections raised, I offer an alternative way of
thinking about guessing which avoids these objections and yet which remains
compatible with Sosa’s wider virtue epistemological framework.
Here is the plan. §2 details Sosa’s account of guessing, taking as a starting
point his EYE EXAM case, which is an important reference point in Chapter
4See Sosa (2015, 72).
5See also Sosa (2010) for discussion on the difference between first-order and reflective
competence.
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3. §3 introduces the notion of performative defeat and highlights, with ref-
erence to performative defeaters, some structural differences between EYE
EXAM and other cases Sosa presents as on a performative par with EYE
EXAM. §4 draws from the Jamesian insight that is that the aim of possess-
ing the truth is best understood as a mixture of two competing aims—truly
representing and not misrepresenting—to suggest that guesses, including re-
liable ones, generate defeaters in a way that (contra Sosa) disqualifies them
from knowledge, animal or otherwise. §5 discusses the approach to guessing
sketched thus far in the wider context of unreliable achievements, and distin-
guishes various species of guesses in connection with what are presented as
practical performative analogues.
2 Sosa on guessing
Sosa (2015) gives the following example:
EYE EXAM: When I go for my exam, I am asked to read the
lines of a chart with letters that shrink line by line from a huge
single letter at the top, to those barely visible at the bottom. At
some point I start to lose confidence that I am getting the letters
right, but I keep going until the technician tells me to stop and
then records some result. At that point there are many cases
where I am quite unsure as to whether it is an “E” or an “F”,
say, or a “P” rather than an “F”, etc. Suppose, however, it turns
out that (unbeknownst to me) I am in fact unfailingly right year
after year at a line where I am thus unsure. At that point I am
in effect “guessing.” I do affirm, to myself in private and to the
technician in public, and I do so in the endeavor to get it right.
That is after all what the test requires: that I try to answer
correctly. And we can surely stipulate that I thereby manifest
a competence, one I do not recognize as reliable enough. This
latter is why I resort to guessing, when I continue to affirm as I
undergo the test. Unbeknownst to me, however, my affirmations
turn out to be surprisingly reliable (2015, 74-5).
EYE EXAM—specifically, the circumstance where one reliably reads the last
line, while unaware that one is reliable in doing so—features what we can
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call reliable guessing. It’s reliable because the examinee is unfailingly right in
affirming the final line in the eye test. But, as Sosa tells us, it’s nonetheless
guessing; you don’t regard your competence as reliable enough in the case of
reading the last line, even though you are.
Here are three central claims Sosa makes about reliable guessing. Firstly,
reliable guessing—like guessing more generally—has a (merely) alethic aim;
in EYE EXAM, the agent aims by guessing to get it right, but not to get it
right aptly6.
Second, the reliable guesser’s belief is a kind of subcredal animal knowledge
(2005, 76): his guesses are not right by luck (Ibid., p. 76); rather, the guesser
affirms in a way that manifests a reliable first-order visual-perceptual com-
petence which is however not recognised by the guesser as reliable enough7.
Thirdly, what distinguishes the knowledge the examinee enjoys of the large
top-row letters from the kind of (subcredal) animal knowledge she enjoys
of the small, bottom row in virtue of, in the latter case, reliably guessing?
Sosa’s answer here is nuanced. He first considers, and then, rejects, that the
epistemically relevant difference between these two cases of affirming with the
aim of getting it right is just that the examinee affirms with comparatively
more confidence the higher-row letters than the bottom-row letters (even
though that is of course the case8).
6As Sosa (2015, 75) puts it, ‘We still affirm at the lower rows, while aiming to get it
right. We give it our best shot, since only thus will we undergo the vision test properly.
But do we aim to get it right, aptly, reliably enough? No, by that point it matters little
whether we do get it right reliably at all […] we make our guess without endeavouring to
get it right aptly’. See also Sosa’s fn. 14.
7See also Sosa’s remarks in Chapter 6, following his discussion of the case of Simone.
Here Sosa reiterates his claim that subcredal animal knowledge requires just apt affirmation,
and so ‘requires only guessing’ (2015, 151). Sosa’s notion of subcredal animal knowledge
is not to be confused with what Goldman and Olsson (2009 §1) call ‘weak knowledge’,
which needn’t be reliable, but only true. Goldman and Olsson, drawing from examples
such as those offered by Hawthorne (2002), point out that it is sometimes felicitous to
attribute knowledge to individuals who generate the right answer to a question, where
the possession on this information contrasts saliently with ignorance (2009, 19-20). On a
further point, I note that the case of Simone is extremely rich and in many ways I think
more complex than his other examples; the case is one I diagnose in detail in a separate
work.
8As Sosa points out, more confidence is something that can be gained through therapy,
with no other change. ‘That would not give us the sort of knowledge we enjoy with
the larger letters. Indeed such artificial increase of confidence can worsen the subject’s
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Rather, Sosa thinks, the difference in epistemic status is to be explained
specifically in terms of a difference in reflective, or second-order, competence
in the two cases. His remarks on this point are illuminating:
Compare someone who gains not just confidence but also confir-
mation that he remains reliably right even when the letters shrink.
This is perhaps the gain that raises him to a higher epistemic level.
Now he might attain the knowledge requiring judgment, not just
a guess. His knowledge would then comprise not only more con-
fidence but also the proper meta-assurance that, even for those
very small letters, his level of competence limits epistemic risk
within proper bounds. Absent such additional confirmation, the
vision-test subject lacks well-founded confidence on the second or-
der that his first-order affirmations are more than sheer guesses.
Even if by hypothesis his guesses are not right just by luck, he
cannot be sure of that, not competently. By contrast, when the
letters near the top are clearly and distinctly discernible, we do
not just guess, which comports with our knowledge that we can
identify those letters for what they are, that our affirmations at
those rows would be apt (2015, 76).
In short, Sosa’s reliable guesser lacks a certain kind of meta-assurance—
viz., assurance that his level of (first-order) competence limits epistemic risk
within proper bounds. The reliable guesser ex hypothesi can’t tell whether
his guesses would be, if right, right by luck.
But note that the second-order assurance the reliable guesser lacks (though
which is not lacked when she affirms the larger letters on the top row) would
not be secured simply by having more confidence that her first order affir-
mations are reliable enough9. Such confidence could be incompetently, or
unfoundedly, gained, as would be the case were the reliable guesser to be-
lieve, on the basis of a wish, that her first-order affirmations were reliable,
even when they were reliable10. Rather, what the reliable guesser lacks is
epistemic position’ (2015, 76). Even though the examinee does have more confidence in
the case of the larger letters, it can’t thus be this confidence that explains the difference
in epistemic standing.
9This is different from having more confidence, of each guess, that it is correct.
10See Sosa (2015, 75, fn. 14).
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knowledge that she can identify those letters for what they are, and so that
her affirmations at this row would be apt. For all the reliable guesser can
knows, they would not be.
3 Performative Defeaters
Sosa’s reliable guesser in EYE EXAM is supposed to be on a kind of ‘perfor-
mative par’ with two other characters from Chapter 3:
(i) the basketball shooter (noted in §1) who aptly makes a
shot from just barely above his threshold of reliability. The
shooter, who succeeds in endeavour to make the basket, is
unaware that he is above his threshold of reliability, and so
too easily would have shot inaptly.
(ii) a huntress who, despite drinking much wine, aptly shoots
a scurrying rabbit in twilight fog. Sosa stipulates that
the huntress’s shot was apt—successful because adroit—
although (like the reliable guesser and the basketball
shooter) not reflectively competent, because the huntress is
unaware that her shot in these conditions would be apt and
has thus underestimated her prowess.
I think, though, that these three cases—the reliable guesser, the basketball
shooter and the huntress—betray some subtle but ultimately important dif-
ferences. The differences end up mattering, I’ll suggest, for whether we
should agree that the reliable guesser in EYE EXAM attains a form of an-
imal knowledge, what Sosa calls ‘subcredal’ animal knowledge, even if we
grant Sosa’s stipulation that the reliable guesser affirms the bottom-row let-
ters aptly. And, the diagnosis for why this is so will lead us to a better
account of guessing (or so I hope to show).
In order to draw out the differences between the three cases, it will be im-
portant to first note a key second-order difference between the case of the
huntress and the basketball player. The basketball player is what we can
call second-order oblivious to the threshold of his own reliability. As Sosa
describes the case, the shooter:
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shoots indiscriminately at distances too near his threshold of suffi-
cient reliability […] In that zone—barely above the threshold—he
is still likely enough to succeed, even without knowing that he is.
So, even in his ignorance he can still perform with animal aptness,
but full aptness is now beyond him (2015, 70).
Being second-order oblivious about whether you are above or below your
threshold for sufficient reliability is different from being second-order mis-
taken about your threshold for sufficient reliability, even though being either
second-order oblivious or second-order mistaken about your threshold for suf-
ficient reliability is enough to prevent your first-order endeavour from being
reflectively competent and thus fully apt.
Sosa’s shooter is second-order oblivious, although to find an individual who
is second-order mistaken, we need only to consider again his huntress, Diana.
As Sosa describes the case, Diana thinks there is little chance of success (in
light of her having drunk much wine, and the twilight fog of the conditions),
and in thinking this, ‘underestimates her prowess’ (2015, 68).
Unlike the basketball shooter, Diana actually thinks that she’s outside our
threshold of reliability, though she happens to be within it. The basket-
ball shooter doesn’t think this. The basketball shooter doesn’t, like Diane
does, underestimate (or for that matter overestimate) his prowess. He simply
shoots aptly whilst lacking any appreciation that he is within his threshold
for sufficient reliability.
The difference between the basketball shooter and Diana can be accounted
for in terms of what we can call performative defeat11. In traditional epis-
temological discussions of defeaters12, defeaters are beliefs or doubts which
count against (in the case of rebutting defeaters) the truth of a target belief,
or (in the case of undercutting defeat) against the reliability of the target
belief’s formation.
Call a subject S’s belief that p a performative defeater if, with respect to
some occasion of endeavour E, S’s belief that p (in the rebutting case) counts
against S’s attaining success in E and (in the undercutting case) calls into
11Cf., Carter and Navarro (2015) for a very different strand of performative defeasi-
bility, one where the object of defeat at issue is specifically knowledge-how, on an anti-
intellectualist construal.
12See, for example, Bergmann (2005); Lackey (2008); Pollock (1986); Sudduth (2008).
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doubt the reliability of S’s competence in E by indicating that were S to
succeed in E, the success would not be apt. Framed this way, it is of course
possible for these defeaters to overlap. For example, suppose that the oc-
casion of endeavour in question is that of sinking a simple two-foot putt.
Suppose though that, through irrationality, a golfer believes that she has
severe Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, an invisible but debilitating connective tis-
sue disorder. The golfer’s belief that she has Ehlers-Danlos is a rebutting
performative defeater. It counts against her successfully attaining her aim
(sinking the putt) on this occasion of endeavour. But it is also undercutting
(in the sense described) because it indicates that were she to succeed, the
success would not be apt—it would not be because of adroitness but because
the ball happened to go in despite unreliable form.
Though rebutting and undercutting performative defeaters can also come
apart. Consider that, as described, performative defeaters are psychological
or mental state defeaters13: they defeat, as Lackey puts it, simply ‘by being
had’, and not by being rational or true. Accordingly, there will be cases
where the two kinds of defeat can come apart.
For example, suppose Sosa’s skilled huntress, Diana, is told that a prankster
has set up invisible forcefields around many, but not all, of the targets in
the field. Suppose further the targets—with and without forcefields—are far
away enough that only one with great skill, such as Diana, would be able to
successfully hit one at such a range. By acquiring the belief that some of
these targets are surrounded by invisible forcefields, the huntress acquires a
performative rebutting defeater, one that counts against her succeeding on
an occasion of endeavour to shoot and hit one of the targets in the field in
these conditions. However, this belief arguably does not indicate that were
the huntress’s shot to be successful, that it would thereby not be apt. Such
a successful shot would surely be creditable in large part to the huntress’
impressive competence14.
13It is also possible to model rebutting and undercutting psychological defeaters as
normative defeaters. Normative defeaters defeat not in virtue of being had but in virtue
of being beliefs or doubts which one (epistemically) should have, regardless of whether
one does in fact have them. For a helpful summary of the differences between these, see
Lackey (2014).
14For some established support for this line of thinking, see Haddock, Millar, and
Pritchard (2010 Ch. 1-3); Pritchard (2012); Kallestrup and Pritchard (2012); Kallestrup
and Pritchard (2013); Kallestrup and Pritchard (2014); Carter and Pritchard (2015a);
Carter and Pritchard (2015b).
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Rebutting and undercutting performative defeaters can come apart in the
other direction as well, where an agent has an undercutting performative
defeater, but not a rebutting performative defeater. Singer Adele Adkins,
for example, reports a dejected experience prior to singing on stage: though
she does not have any doubts about how to sing the notes she is meant to
sing—it is not as though she scrambles to double-check the lyrics or wor-
ries irrationally that she is suddenly too hoarse to sing them—she reports
worrying, in a nebulous sense (perhaps irrationally), that she will bomb the
performance. Adele, to stress, does not report having any beliefs, about any
particular notes or songs, that she does not know how to sing them. She
rather has doubts about herself—viz., that her performing a set of songs on
stage will manifest her competence to sing them. Thus: an undercutting
performative defeater in the absence of a rebutting performative defeater.
With the foregoing picture of performative defeaters in mind, we can now
diagnose in a more principled way the key difference between Sosa’s basket-
ball shooter, second-order oblivious, and the huntress, second-order mistaken,
both of whom (like the reliable guesser in EYE EXAM) perform aptly at the
first-order but, without second-order reflective competence, not fully aptly.
Here is the difference: the second-order oblivious basketball shooter does not
have a performative defeater (rebutting or undercutting)15, but the huntress
does. The huntress has at least an undercutting performative defeater, given
how Sosa has described the case, plausibly also a performative rebutting de-
feater16. This is the case even though both are alike in that their respective
15At least, the huntress has one kind of performative defeater, an undercutting perfor-
mative defeater, which the second-order oblivious basketball shooter does not have. This
point holds independently of the separate issue of whether either has a normative de-
feater. For the present purposes, and to avoid what is I think unnecessary complication in
light of the present point being made, I remain neutral as to whether we should regard the
second-order oblivious basketball shooter (or Diana for that matter) as having a normative
defeater.
16It is the huntress’s explicit underestimation of her prowess that constitutes for her
an undercutting performative defeater, in the sense described. This is compatible with
her also having a rebutting performative defeater, which she would have if she, further,
positively believed (or at least, doubted) that she would successfully hit the rabbit. Sosa’s
discussion of the case indicates that Diana probably also entertains such doubts, though
this isn’t made explicit. What is of particular relevance to the comparison between Diana
and the case of the basketball shooter is that the basketball shooter, in virtue of being
second-order oblivious, does not have either kind of performative defeater, whereas Diana
has at least an undercutting performative defeater.
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performances are apt but not reflectively competent and so not fully apt.
Now, I think it matters for whether Sosa is right that his reliable guesser
in EYE EXAM attains subcredal animal knowledge, whether the reliable
guesser is more like the basketball shooter (who is second-order oblivious,
with no performative defeater) or the huntress (who is second-order mistaken,
with a performative defeater). In the next section, I want to argue that the
reliable guesser is in fact like the huntress, not the basketball player, vis-
a-vis performative defeat. This, it will be suggested, a consequence of the
particular way that guessing, as a representational attitude distinct from
ordinary belief, should be understood as having an alethic aim.
4 Guessing, the truth aim, and defeat
A point familiar from William James (1897) is that the aim of possessing the
truth is best understood as a mixture of two competing aims: truly repre-
senting and not misrepresenting17. This would be relatively uninteresting if
these aims were in no way in competition with one another18.
However, there is an important sense in which truly representing and not
misrepresenting are competing aims. This point can be made in terms of risk:
one can only fulfil the first aim by putting oneself at risk of not fulfilling the
second. Weighting the second aim, not misrepresenting, more would lead one
to be more cautious so as to avoid possible misrepresentation. Correspond-
ingly, weighting the first aim more would lead one to be bolder in order to
possess more truths.
In Carter, Jarvis and Rubin (Forthcoming), we showed how different ways
of mixing these two aims correspond to doxastic attitudes at different places
in the hierarchy of representational attitudes. Here is a brief overview of this
idea:
17As James (1897) puts it: ‘There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter
of opinion […] We must know the truth; and we must avoid error–these are our first and
great commandments […]’ For more contemporary expressions of this idea, see Alston
(1985); Foley (1987); David (2001); Fallis (2006). See also Carter, Jarvis and Rubin (2015;
forthcoming).
18Or—in Martin Smith’s (2014) terminology—if these aims were normatively coinci-
dent—viz., if they were such that one could not aim at one without automatically aiming
at the other (2014, 273).
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There are attitudes like being-sure, where the second aim is appro-
priately weighted more (so that misrepresentation is worse and
failing to truly represent isn’t so bad), and there are attitudes like
suspecting, where the first aim is appropriately weighted more (so
that failing to truly represent is worse and misrepresentation isn’t
so bad). But, the aim of all of these doxastic attitudes is to possess
the truth by having the attitude. It’s just the mixture of the twin
aims—how important they should be in different situations—that
varies.
Guessing is very much like suspecting19 in the following sense: both are
attitudes that, by taking them up, we aim at truth, but in a sense that
is weaker, or less cautious, than belief20. With states like suspecting and
guessing, more error possibilities are tolerable in order take a chance on
possessing the truth21. I won’t rehearse our argument for this picture here22.
However, to the extent that the model proposed is a plausible one—viz.,
that in taking up the attitude of suspecting, or guessing, we aim at the
truth in a way that affords more weight to truly representing than to not-
misrepresenting (and vice versa for the attitude of being-sure-that)—we have
cause to wonder whether ‘knowledge’ (animal or otherwise) is really what we
should call whatever achievements ensue from reliable guessing or suspecting.
In order to appreciate this point, contrast Sosa’s reliable guesser with a slight
variation on EYE EXAM, involving a reliable believer. Suppose the reliable
19Sosa, in Chapter 8, revisits the eye exam case, and in his discussion, he notes that
suspecting and assuming are kinds of guesses, guesses without affirmation. It’s not clear
to me whether suspecting, on the model advanced in Carter et al. (Forthcoming), should
be thought of a non-affirmative attempt at attaining the truth, or rather, as a way of
affirming which differs from ordinary (belief-based) affirming in the way that the twin
goals of representing truly and not-representing are weighted.
20On Sosa’s model, there are two primary varieties of belief: functional beliefs and
judgments. The discussion of belief, in this section and with reference to the model
advanced in Carter et al. (Forthcoming), pertains to belief, per se.
21As it was suggested, misrepresenting because one is deceived by an evil Cartesian
demon is an example of an error possibility that is tolerable for belief, but not for the atti-
tude of being absolutely certainty. On the model advanced in Carter et al. (Forthcoming
§4), we suggested that by tolerating all error possibilities, one is giving maximal weight to
truly representing, whereas by tolerating no error possibilities, one is giving all the weight
to not misrepresenting.
22See here also Carter et al. (2015 §3).
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believer and the reliable guesser’s first-order visual-perceptual competence is
identical. Both affirm the top letters more easily. The reliable guesser affirms
by resorting to guessing at the bottom row, the reliable believer affirms by
believing. What is the difference between the two23? Saying there is no
difference is of course not a viable option24. But, the most viable way to
account for what such a difference would be will ultimately be in tension with
Sosa’s diagnosis of the reliable guesser’s achievement as animal knowledge
(subcredal or otherwise). I’ll now explain this point.
Firstly, consider that the reliable believer is best understood as on a perfor-
mative par with Sosa’s basketball shooter. Recall that the basketball shooter,
who makes a shot from just above his threshold for sufficient reliability, but
unaware of this, was second-order oblivious, not second-order mistaken, and
this was the more fine grained characterisation of why the shooter lacked
reflective competence. So described, we said that Sosa’s basketball shooter
did not have a performative defeater, as the huntress surely did. The same is
the case for a ‘belief’ variation on Sosa’s reliable guesser. That is, if we hold
fixed the first-order competence of Sosa’s reliable guesser in affirming the
bottom row letters–in which case the letters still appear somewhat blurry,
even though they are affirmed correctly–but suppose that the attitude taken
up is a belief rather than a guess, we are now in the same position as the bas-
ketball shooter: we have a first-order apt performance that is not reflectively
competent because the performance is second-order oblivious.
23It is worth considering here a difference between both guessing, and believing, and
estimating. The difference is, I think, a matter of whether the individual takes a chance
on possessing the truth directly or indirectly. The guesser takes a chance on possessing
the truth directly by affirming. By estimating, one affirms in the endeavour to be near
enough right, where near enough right is the proximal goal, and truth is the distal goal.
There is some philosophical precedent for regarding estimating as corresponding to a dis-
tinctive faculty, different from belief-forming faculties. The medieval philosopher Ibn Sina
(Avicenna) defended such a distinctive estimative faculty under the description of wahm.
However, Avicenna’s characterisation of wahm leaves one to suspect that he had in mind
a faculty that was fundamentally emotive rather than cognitive. An example Avicenna
frequently uses involves an estimative judgment of hostility, as one might experience when
nearby a wolf. In some passages, Avicenna explicitly divorces wahm from what he calls
the intellect. See Avicenna (1027 [1952]).
24Sosa refers to subcredal animal knowledge as ‘below even the animal knowledge that
requires belief’ (2015, 76), expressing his view that subcredal animal knowledge is not a
kind of doxastic (belief-based) animal knowledge, but animal knowledge that arises from
taking up the lower or ‘weaker’ representational attitude of guessing.
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But Sosa’s reliable guesser is not second-order oblivious, like she would be
were she taking up the attitude of belief. And here I think (i) the heirarchial
model of representational attitudes as a function of mixing the competing
aims of truly representing and not misrepresenting, along with the notion of
(ii) performative defeat introduced in §1, can help us to diagnose just why.
Here it will be helpful, initially, to consider the classic case of the chicken-
sexer25. This is paradigmatic case of an individual with a reliable competence
but who is not reflectively competent because second-order oblivious. The
chicken sexer purports to believe of each chick, what its sex is—the chicken
sexer would not tell you she was guessing. She is believing. This is so even
though the chicken sexer cannot furnish you with any grounds for her belief.
As Sosa (2015, 76) rightly suggests, the chicken sexer attains an apt belief,
and so animal knowledge.
Now, let’s run a quick variation on the chicken-sexer case. Suppose that
the chicken-sexer took herself to resort to guessing, rather than believing.
Suppose she tells you she was guessing. Does she attain animal knowledge,
provided we assume the first-order reliable competence (at sexing chickens)
is the same as it is in the original case? Provided she is sincere, the answer
should be no, and the explanation for this has two parts. The chicken sexer, in
regarding herself as guessing, plausibly has acquired a psychological defeater
that is lacked by the believing chicken-sexer. Indeed, unless one is guessing
while regarding oneself as believing, one is, resorting to guessing, acquiring
a psychological defeater—namely, that she is guessing—which undermines
(unless defeated) one’s animal knowledge.
Why is this? Why is mere awareness that one’s aim at truth is a guess, itself
enough to constitute a defeater, one that suffices to defeat animal knowledge?
The answer is that regarding oneself as guessing is as the same time regarding
oneself as aiming at truth in a way that tolerates more error possibilities than
are plausibly tolerated by knowledge26. Guesses can be apt, no doubt. But
when they are, the ensuing achievement is not reliable enough to qualify
as knowledge, animal or otherwise, because of the type of bold attempt at
truth which a guess is, one which weights representing truly much more than
25See, for example, Goldman (1975).
26A corollary to this point is that, by endeavouring to possess the truth by guessing,
one endeavours to possess the truth in the absence of normal default trust (see here Sosa
2015, 81).
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not-representing falsely27.
The basketball-performative analogue to the chicken-sexer-cum guesser and
also to Sosa’s own reliable guesser will be a player who regards herself as
having attempted to score in a manner that tolerates greater-than-average
error possibility—by shooting-via-chucking the ball—than in normal circum-
stances. Even if, by stipulation, the basketball player’s chucking form is
actually reliable enough, the fact that the basketball player regards herself as
chucking the ball—a method she appreciates to be less reliable than usual—
rather than shooting normally, the shooter acquires a performative defeater
which renders the shot on par with the chicken-sexer-cum-guesser—namely
that they are aiming at attaining the truth by guessing, and so thereby by
tolerating greater than normal error.
Sosa’s reliable guesser in EYE EXAM is on a performative par with the
following three reflectively incompetent individuals: the chicken-sexer-cum-
guesser and the basketball player who acquires a performative defeater in
light of knowingly chucking the ball28, unknowingly doing so reliably, and
Diana, who is second-order mistaken by underestimating her prowess from
the range at which she is shooting. None of these characters is second-
order oblivious; each is second-order mistaken in a way that generates a
performative defeater. The basketball chucker because he regards himself as
issuing a shot from what he takes to be a less-than-reliable enough form, and
27The foregoing discussion is compatible with granting that beliefs and guesses can
potentially not differ in their reliability. However, as an anonymous referee at Synthese
has pointed out to me, in some cases, coming to believe that you are guessing could
actually have the consequence of reducing one’s reliability in the relevant domain, perhaps
substantially. This is because regarding oneself as taking on above-normal levels of risk
could potentially generate for one a behavioural confirmation effect, where the individual
over time increases the level of risk undertaken, rendering her doxastic performances (in
the relevant domain) less truth-conducive, and below the threshold of reliability required
for first-order aptness. Though, even when such a behavioural confirmation effect does
not materialise, one’s simply regarding oneself on a given occasion as affirming in a way
that involves above-normal levels of risk is itself sufficient to generate a defeater for the
agent’s would-be knowledge.
28Note that this case is not meant to be the same as a case where one chucks the ball
from half-court. The latter is best construed as analogous to a wild guess, of which I saw
more later. Rather, the case referenced above is one where we are to imagine that the
shooter, from barely within his threshold of sufficient reliability, attempts to make the
basket while using a chucking style, a style regarded by the shooter to be not sufficiently
reliable, even though it in fact is.
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the chicken-sexer-cum guesser and Sosa’s reliable guesser because both have
a belief which counts against their affirmations being reliable enough–namely
that they are aiming at attaining the truth by guessing, and so by tolerating
greater than normal error.
There is an important disanalogy then between these three reflectively incom-
petent individuals and another three reflectively incompetent individuals: the
(ordinary) chicken sexer, and Sosa’s basketball shooter (unaware that he is
just above his threshold for reliability), and as his EYE EXAM examinee
would be were the examinee to have trafficked in beliefs rather than guesses.
5 Some new parallels
To the extent that the previous section’s discussion is right, then if there is
such a thing as sub-credal animal knowledge, it will not be acquired in cases
where an individual, no matter how reliable she is in the relevant domain of
endeavour, takes herself to be guessing. The way that, when guessing, we
aim at truth is a way which gives disproportionate weight to representing
truly versus not misrepresenting, and as such is distinguished as an attitude
which, just by taking up this attitude, we take a chance on attaining the
truth by tolerating more error possibilities than usual, more than is plausibly
tolerated by knowledge. As such, by regarding oneself as guessing—that is,
when one guesses and is not mistaken that one is guessing—one thereby
acquires a defeater which one would need to defeat in order to attain animal
knowledge29. One way to defeat this defeater would be to, say, learn from the
eye professional that one is extremely reliable, such that then one no longer
29Cf., however, Hetherington (2001, 155–56) for some dissent. On Hetherington’s view—
what he calls gradualism—some guesses can qualify as knowledge, though what he calls
‘bad knowledge’, knowledge of the lowest grade, which requires only true belief. Though he
recognises that this is a minority position. Other rare defenders of the view that true belief,
by lucky guess or otherwise, secures knowledge are Kutschera (1982), Sartwell (1992) and
Meno of Thessaly, who briefly advanced the view that knowledge is mere true opinion
in the Meno. See also Foley (2012) for a more sophisticated defence of this view, on
which knowledge is secured by true belief in conjunction with adequate information. For
a survey of various views which have, with different qualifications, come close to the view
that knowledge is true belief, see Martens (2006) overview of ‘epistemological minimalism’.
For explicit criticism of minimalist approaches, see Lycan (1994) and Kvanvig (2003 Ch.
1).
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regards herself as guessing when she affirms the letters on the lower row, so
that now she believes what she affirms at the bottom row.
I want to conclude by doing three final things. Firstly, to make some re-
marks about unreliable achievements, secondly, to sharpen the discussion of
weighting representing truly more so than not misrepresenting, in the case
of guessing, and thirdly, to advance—from within Sosa’s own programme—
some performative parallels that I think map on to a range of different kinds
of guesses.
5.1 Unreliable achievements
Even if guesses cannot aspire to knowledge, animal or otherwise, this is not
to say that guesses cannot be apt. In fact, Sosa’s reliable guesser’s beliefs are
surely apt, in that their accuracy manifests a first-order reliable competence.
In Carter et al. (2015), we suggested that, just as there are varieties of
representational attitudes that aim at truth differently (by corresponding,
in the proper governance of these states, with different ways in which the
twin goods of attaining truth and avoiding error are weighted), there are
also varieties of cognitive achievements. An advantage of our model was an
explanation for why knowledge, cum cognitive achievement, must ordinarily
be safe, and this is because of the particular kind of attempt at success that
belief is—namely, an attempt that places the premium it does on avoiding
error.
Some achievements, including physical and artistic achievements, are of
course highly unreliable, issued by means that ordinarily wouldn’t be suc-
cessful. Here’s one blatant such example, suggested by Turri (Forthcoming):
BABY STEPS: Geno is eleven months old. He’s daily been gain-
ing confidence in his ability to balance on two feet. Today he
stood holding onto the couch when an object in Dad’s hand com-
manded his attention. Inspired, Geno let go and, to his parents’
delight, took his first two steps in Dad’s direction (Turri, Forth-
coming, 14).
Likewise, consider the case of a potter:
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POTTER: Ben produces his signature pottery, which is highly
regarded, by methods that very often produce cracked and broken
failures. In order to produce a new work, he may, in the typical
instance, have to make several (or many) attempts. Ordinarily,
his ways of making pottery is unsafe30.
BABY STEPS and POTTER are examples of a phenomenon perhaps best
captured with reference to the case of Red Sox batting champion Ted
Williams: arguably the greatest hitter in the history of baseball, and who
hit safely only 40% of the time. What BABY STEPS, POTTER and the
case of Ted Williams suggest is just that some achievements are unreliable,
in that they are issued by unsafe methods.
In the cognitive case, this is to be expected as well. When, for example, Sher-
lock Holmes makes an educated guess31—one that turns out to be right—this
is a cognitive achievement, one creditable to his abductive prowess, though
it is not knowledge, animal or otherwise. This is the case even if Sherlock’s
guessing turns out to be as reliable as Sosa’s reliable guesser in EYE EXAM.
Sherlock, like the reliable guesser, provided they appreciate that they are
guessing, acquire a defeater—that, in taking a chance on attaining truth,
they’ve by guessing tolerated more error possibilities than in normal circum-
stances, and more than is plausibly tolerated by knowledge.
5.2 Guesses and weighting
Suppose a fair coin is flipped, and then covered up. What is your credence
that the coin has landed heads? It should be .5. You of course shouldn’t
believe that that the coin has landed heads. And this is as it should be; belief
corresponds with a mixture of the weighting the aims of believing truly and
not misrepresenting which places a premium on not misrepresenting. In short,
this situation is riskier than what befits belief32.
30This example is adapted from Carter et al. (2015, 1603).
31I’ll discuss different kinds of guessing, including educated guessing, in more detail later
in this section.
32Plausibly, the appropriate attitude here is withholding, or suspending belief or judg-
ment. For a recent critical discussion of what such an attitude involves, see Friedman
(2013).
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But do you guess that the coin is heads? Perhaps only if there is some practi-
cal pressure to affirm one way or the other. Nothing you know favours heads
over tails. But you can nonetheless, in this circumstance, take a reckless
chance on possessing the truth—and if it turns up heads, you were right.
Call the representational attitude—one that gives a maximal weight to rep-
resenting truly and affords no weight to not misrepresenting—a blind guess33.
The performative analogue, in basketball, would be taking a shot, with no
appreciation of one’s orientation with respect to the basket—viz., a shot in
total darkness. This is an attempt at success which tolerates nearly all error
possibilities34. It is fitting that blind guesses are sometimes referred to as
shots in the dark.
But not all guesses are blind. Sosa’s reliable guesser is not after all, en-
tirely insensitive to the aim of misrepresenting, even if he takes himself to be
guessing. Granted during the examination, as the letters get smaller, Sosa
describes ‘I start to lose confidence that I am getting the letters right’. But
plausibly some confidence is retained, such that from the perspective of the
guesser, some error possibilities are excluded. As Sosa describes the case,
‘there are many cases where I am quite unsure as to whether it is an “E” or
an “F”, say, or a “P” rather than an “F”, etc. (2015, 74).’ This is a famil-
iar situation: one where we affirm, due to some practical pressure to do so,
while aware that some, though not all, relevant error possibilities remain live.
Sosa’s guesser is not, plausibly, unsure whether the letter before him is an
“I” rather than an “F”.
Guessing is a genus with different species. Guessing, as such, involves taking
chance on attaining truth in a way that mixes the aims of truly representing
and not misrepresenting less cautiously than belief, and in doing so tolerates
comparatively more epistemic risk. Guesses can be more or less cautious,
and I’ll elaborate on this point in the next section by drawing some athletic-
33Sosa himself discusses this kind of guessing under the description of a sheer guess,
which is not what the reliable guesser is doing (see Sosa 2015, 151, fn. 14).
34The range of all error possibilities that’s applicable depends in part on the relevant
whether question. For example, you can take a blind guess and thus tolerate all error
possibilities on a multiple choice test—choose A, B, C or D—by tolerating just three
error possibilities. Blind guessing a given rational number, to be randomly generated by
a machine, tolerates a potentially infinite number of error possibilities. In both cases,
though, the blind guess as such is a chance on possessing truth that embraces maximal
risk in the context of the guess.
19
performative analogues.
It is worth highlighting that the foregoing characterisation of guessing is com-
patible with Sosa’s account of the normativity of guessing–viz., as affirmation
in the endeavour ‘to get it right, without affirming in the endeavor to get
it right reliably enough’–even though the foregoing is incompatible with the
suggestion that reliable guessing aspires to knowledge (subcredal, animal or
otherwise)35.
5.3 Performative analogies
Recall now some performative parallels that have already been drawn: a
blind guess is akin to taking a shot at making a basket in conditions where
one lacks any appreciation of one’s orientation to the basket—viz., a shot
in the dark. A more cautious attempt at gaining a truth is a wild guess,
which involves affirming in the endeavour to get it right, but while tolerating
more error possibilities than does Sosa’s reliable guesser, when the reliable
guesser affirms while unsure whether a given letter is an “E”, an “F” or a “P”.
The wild guesser by contrast affirms (for example) while unsure, of a given
letter, whether it is (in this case) any somewhat wide letter, thus excluding
letters such as “I”. If the guesser cannot even rule out the “I”, and so affirms
35It is worth noting one potential line of reply here, to the effect that defeaters which
defeat credal knowledge (either, animal or reflective) do not defeat subcredal animal knowl-
edge. If this were the case, then, plausibly, a reliable guesser could be a candidate for sub-
credal animal knowledge. There are at least two problems which would face any attempt to
defend such a line. Firstly, one might endorse this line because one thinks that subcredal
animal knowledge is indefeasible—immune to being undermined by ordinary mechanisms
of defeat. Without some principled reason to treat subcredal knowledge as special in this
respect, this line does not look promising. A slightly weaker way to suggest that defeaters
which defeat credal knowledge do not defeat subcredal knowledge would need to make
some kind of argument from strength—to the effect that defeaters which suffice to defeat
credal knowledge are not strong enough to defeat subcredal animal knowledge. This is
weaker than the previous envisioned line because it is not committed to the indefeasibility
of subcredal knowledge. However, on closer inspection, the weaker line looks similarly
unprincipled. After all, it would mysterious indeed why the title of ‘knowledge’ should be
retained in the presence of undefeated defeaters (of the sort which defeat credal knowl-
edge), even if some positive subcredal epistemic status were retained. Thanks to Modesto
Gômez-Alonso.
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without being able to rule out any contextually relevant error possibilities36,
the guess is not wild but blind. I suggested in §1 the basketball-performative
analogue to a wild guess is a shot from half-court, under normal conditions;
one can control one’s shot choice so as to exclude shooting away from the
basket, which cannot be ruled out when taking a shot in the dark, while
nonetheless knowingly taking a chance on a basket that tolerates most error
possibilities.
It’s convenient to give guesses such names as blind and wild when they toler-
ate all or most error possibilities, by involving affirming in a way that affords
either no or barely any weight to the aim of not misrepresenting.
But there are plenty of other varieties of guess which are less easily named—
though a helpful way to think about them is by juxtaposing them with their
practical performance analogues. Specifically, we can do this by considering
cases where the performative defeaters in cognitive and non-cognitive cases
line up.
Sosa’s own reliable guesser was, I suggested, analogous not to the basketball
shooter, second-order oblivious, who shoots from just above his threshold for
reliability. That basketball shooter did not have a performative defeater. The
shooter would, however, were he to have chucked (rather than shot normally)
the ball in a way that was unbeknownst to him reliable enough. That’s the
analogue to reliable guessing.
We can distinguish Sosa’s reliable guesser from a guesser in a slightly dif-
ferent situation, which is best appreciated by considering first an athletic-
performative parallel. Suppose firstly that Sosa’s basketball shooter is at a
range very slightly below his threshold for sufficient reliability, but that he
knows that this is the case, and takes (and makes) the shot anyway. This is
similar to, but not quite like, the case of the individual who chucks the ball,
unbeknownst to her, reliably. It’s similar in that both regard themselves as
tolerating above-normal risk (the former because she regards chucking to fall
short of reliable enough form, the latter because she knows that from that
distance, using normal form, she’s slightly below the threshold for sufficient
reliability). But the cases are different in that the shooter—shooting nor-
mally but knowingly slightly below his threshold for sufficient reliability—is
36In the context of an eye examination, the contextually relevant error possibilities
are restricted to possible letters. It’s common knowledge, in this context, that error
possibilities do not include things such as numerals and non-letter shapes.
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(unlike the chucker who is unknowingly reliable) actually not sufficiently re-
liable, even though the shot is successful. So reliable guessing cannot be the
right cognitive analogue performance.
The right analogue here is, I think, what we can call a (mere) educated guess.
This will be when one, for example, hears from the reliable testimony of
the optician that the next row is (based on a very recent calculation) very
near, but just below, her threshold for sufficient reliability, and indeed the
individual affirms correctly, but through a competence she knows is just
barely not sufficiently reliable37.
A final species of guess, different from those noted so far, that I think merits
attention is analogous to a more complex—but not entirely uncommon—kind
of performative situation. Consider the following:
3-POINTER: Steph, an excellent 3-point shooter, often reads his
detailed shooting statistics to assess whether he is reliable enough
from various places outside the 3-point line, to warrant taking
open shots. Steph had recently read a statistical analysis of his
performance from various ranges. The source he consulted, http:
//www.fivethirtyeight.com, uses expert Bayesian modeling, and
Steph has no reason do doubt the source’s reliability38. Steph
is confident that if this source says he is above his threshold for
sufficient reliability at a given range, then he is. Accordingly, on
the basis of this source, Steph believes that he is reliable enough
from 28 feet to warrant taking an open shot at 28 feet. However,
Steph’s coach also read the piece, and told Steph prior to today’s
game, that he is sure the number was 27, not 28. Steph thinks
his coach is almost certainly wrong, and continues to believe that
the number is 28—but nonetheless, in light of being unable (on
the court) to dismiss this error possibility, Steph accepts that he
does not know that he is reliable enough from 28 feet, despite his
continuing to believe this. He takes an open shot from 28 feet
and makes it.
37This bears a close semblance to the everyday usage of ‘educated guess’ wherein one
takes a chance on truth while believing she is tolerating above-normal risk in doing so,
though below the level of above-normal risk one takes when chancing on truth via a wild
guess.
38http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/stephen-currys-bombs-are-too-good-to-be-true/
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This case is unlike any of the others so far. Firstly, like the reliable guesser,
Steph is sufficiently reliable from 28 feet. (Suppose that Steph’s coach was in-
correct). But, unlike the reliable guesser, Steph believes he is reliable enough
from 28 feet, despite (in light of the on-court incorrect testimony from his
coach) believing that he does not know this. Like the educated guesser, Steph
has sought out reliable independent information about his reliability range.
Unlike the educated guesser, Steph believes, before taking his shot, that he
is from that distance reliable enough.
Does Steph have a performative defeater, in the sense articulated in §2? Yes.
The on-court belief he acquires, that his coach insists the article noted 27
rather than 28 as his reliable-enough threshold, counts against the reliability
of Steph’s competence from 28 feet by indicating that were Steph to succeed
in from 28 feet, the success would not be apt. Steph, it was stipulated, has
doubts about the accuracy of this defeater, but—standing on the court—he
does not regard himself as able to rule it out, to defeat the defeater, and so
regards himself as not knowing he is reliable enough from that range, despite
believing that he is.
What species of guess will be the cognitive parallel to 3-POINTER? In order
to get this right, let’s try to model this kind of performative defeater Steph
has acquired as closely as we can, in the cognitive case:
PI: Elodin, a gambler, is attempting to memorise pi to at least one
digit past any of his friends, without making any errors (a single
error nullifies the recitation, disqualifying him from winning the
bet). Elodin has Cartesian certainty that the first three numbers
are 3.14. Beyond that, his confidence ever so gradually wanes.
Elodin’s record, in practice, is 60 digits before failing. But, after
practicing many times, he’s concluded that he is reliable enough,
in the context of the bet, only to attempt to recite pi up 40 digits.
The 40th digit of pi is a “1”. the 39th digit is “7.39” Prior to the
bet, a friend tells him that his calculations of his own reliability
are are very slightly off and that, on the basis of Elodin’s practice
records, he’s in fact reliable enough only to attempt the first 39
digits, not the 40th. Elodin believes his friend is wrong, but, he
realises he cannot conclusively rule this out. Elodin, believing—
but believing that he does not know—that the 40th digit of pi is
39The first 40 digits of pi are: 3.1415926535897932384626433832795028841971.
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a “1”, does not stop at the 39th digit. He affirms, correctly, that
the 40th digit is a “1”.
Elodin affirms the “1” while believing he does not know he is reliable enough
(given that knows he can’t rule out that his friend is right, despite believing
his friend is wrong) in the context of his affirmation. This affirmation is as
such a species of guess: an attempt at truth whereby one takes a chance on
gaining a truth in a way that tolerates more than usual error. But the risk
Elodin knowingly undertakes here is marginal. He does not believe he is not
reliable enough; he merely believes he does not know he is reliable enough,
while believing he is.
Call this species of guess a conjectural affirmation. In the case of Elodin,
the doubt he has, though it is appreciated as undefeated in the context of
the affirmation, is compresent with his competent belief that he is reliable
enough. Elodin, as well as Steph, after all, believe on good grounds that they
are reliable enough, and affirm and shoot respectively while maintaining they
do not know they are reliable enough. Conjectural affirmations, like other
guesses, do not aspire to knowledge (animal or otherwise40).
40An interesting application of this line concerns the phenomenon of stereotype threat,
which occurs when individuals who belong to negatively stereotyped groups regard them-
selves as likely to perform in accordance with the negative stereotype, and this tendency
increases when one reflects on one’s membership in a stigmatised group (see, for exam-
ple, Alfano (2014)). In extreme cases of stereotype threat, an individual from a group
stereotyped as lacking in intelligence might, upon reflecting on her group membership,
positively believe that she is cognitively unreliable at whatever task she is pursuing. If
such an individual affirms nonetheless, her attempt at truth incurs a defeater and so she
lacks knowledge (lest she can defeat the defeater, for instance, by coming to understand
the mechanisms of stereotype threat). The perniciousness of stereotype threat becomes
even clearer, though, when we consider less extreme cases, which are more in keeping
with conjectural affirmations, such as in the case of Elodin. In such cases, suppose the
marginalised individual, upon bringing to mind her marginalised group membership, sim-
ply comes to doubt her reliability (to some extent) while retaining her belief that she is
reliable enough. In such a circumstance, even such an individual’s belief is not (on the
view I’m proposing) a candidate for knowledge for the same reason that Elodin’s conjec-
tural affirmation is not a candidate for knowledge. This is a frustrating but I think correct
consequence of the view advanced here, one which highlights a special case of epistemic
injustice. As Alfano (2014) has indicated, a way to combat this injustice is to give such
marginalised individuals the capacity to defeat the kind of defeaters they acquire when
subjected to stereotype threat, by learning about how stereotype threat works. Thanks to
an anonymous referee at Synthese for suggesting I address this issue.
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6 Concluding remarks
In the foregoing, I’ve shown why Sosa’s view of guessing mistakenly identi-
fies certain kinds of guesses as candidates for knowledge. I’ve argued for a
different way of thinking about guessing, as a kind of attitude that by its
very nature incurs a kind of defeater which is acquired when one takes a
chance on truth by tolerating above-normal levels of risk. The rationale for
the view advanced draws importantly from the Jamesian insight that the
aim of possessing the truth is best understood as a mixture of two compet-
ing aims—truly representing and not misrepresenting. After situating my
favoured approach to the attitude of guessing in the wider context of unreli-
able achievements, I concluded by distinguishing various species of guesses in
connection with what are presented as their practical performative analogues.
I want to close by noting that I believe Sosa’s overarching project in Judgment
and Agency is a tremendous achievement in epistemology. It is, I think, his
most compelling presentation of his distinctive brand of virtue epistemology
to date. The aim here has not been to challenge Sosa’s wider framework, as
such, but to suggest how—from within this rich framework—a better account
of guessing can be advanced, one which squares better with plausible insights
about knowledge and epistemic defeat41.
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